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ABSTRACT
This paper is based on the context of electronic knowledge repositories (EKR). There are many problems in people using
EKR to share knowledge. We can classify these problems into three types: 1) Free-riding situation, 2) Non-use situation, 3)
Dormant situation. Many organizations use rewards to motivate people to contribute knowledge into EKR, but there has been
no conclusive evidence of the role of reward. We designed two game-theoretical models: 1) to explain why and how the
different knowledge sharing problems occur in EKR and, 2) to promote a better understanding of the effect of rewards in
EKR. We found that a reward is misleading if it concentrates only on quantity of knowledge, that is, participants will
contribute more quantity but lower quality of knowledge into the network. Our suggestion is that organizations not only add
rewards, but also apply some knowledge review systems. The strategy of adding review systems can motivate people to
contribute high quality knowledge.
Keywords
Game theory, electronic knowledge repositories, knowledge sharing, social exchange theory
INTRODUCTION
Knowledge sharing is a key aspect of knowledge management (Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Wasko and Faraj, 2000) as it
can enable organizations to leverage their most valuable asset of sharing their knowledge with others.
With the development of information and communication technology (ICT), more and more organizations are using
knowledge management system (KMS). There are two basic models of KMS: the repository model and the network model
(Alavi, 2000). Electronic knowledge repository (EKR) is an important form of KMS (Kankanhalli, Tan and Wei, 2005). The
EKR model emphasizes codification and storage of knowledge so as to be reused in the future.
In practice, however, the availability of ICT is no guarantee that knowledge sharing will actually take place (Alavi and
Leidner, 1999). The most serious problem is that people are reluctant to share their knowledge with others in KMS.
Many prior studies have investigated the factors affecting EKR usage of single participants (Kankanhalli, et al., 2005;
Kollock, 1999; Markus, 2001; Wasko and Faraj, 2000). Few studies have reported on how the behavior of one participant
impacts on that of others. This current study focuses on the interaction of participants in EKR, and discusses the effectiveness
of rewards for facilitating knowledge sharing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the knowledge sharing behaviors in EKR and three
types of knowledge sharing dilemmas. The third section reviews relevant theories and related studies. We then present two
models: a simple model and a complex model. The effectiveness of rewards in each model is studied. After discussing the
results of the analysis, we conclude the paper with recommendations for future research.
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KNOWLEDGE SHARING BEHAVIOR IN EKR
Repository model
The knowledge sharing model in EKR is represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The model of knowledge sharing in EKR
Decisions of participants: Contribution and Usage
The knowledge sharing processes in EKR include people contributing knowledge to the repositories and using the knowledge
from EKR (Ba, Stallaert and Whinston, 2001). Each participant makes 2 decisions when using EKR related to: 1)
contributing knowledge into EKR; 2) using knowledge from EKR (Goodman and Darr, 1998).
Types of Participants in EKR: Active and Potential Contributors
There are many different types of participants that play different roles in knowledge sharing systems. Brazelton and Gorry
(2003) describe the interaction of different participant types in an EKR related to education. The first visitors in systems are
“active contributors” that provide teaching materials. These participants have high self-efficacy and are eager to share their
knowledge. All participants can download these materials. The participants who benefit from the knowledge will then
contribute their new ideas to the system. However, there are also many passive participants called “lurkers” who do not
contribute knowledge and may not adopt the knowledge. Because the passive participants have the potential opportunity to
contribute, they can be recognized as potential contributors. Markus (2001) identified 3 roles in knowledge reuse, as:
producer, consumer and intermediary. Multiple individuals may act in each role and one individual may act in multiple roles.
The producer contributes knowledge and the consumer adopts it. Intermediary indexes and packages knowledge for reuse.
The role of the intermediary is to facilitate knowledge sharing, but it does not involve direct participation activities.  We
divide participants of knowledge sharing into 2 types: Active contributors (P1) and potential contributors (P2). The role of
intermediary will be connected to “knowledge stewards” strategy in the discussion. The process of knowledge sharing
between P1 and P2 can be seen in Figure 2:
Figure 2. The knowledge sharing process between P1 and P2
Although after P1 first visit EKR and contribute knowledge, they do not benefit from adopting the knowledge of others at
this time. P2 then make decisions of whether to use knowledge from EKR, and to contribute their new knowledge into EKR.
Finally, P1 will choose whether to use this new knowledge.
Problems of knowledge sharing in EKR:
In public good theory, individual rationality may lead to collective irrationality (Kollock, 1999). We can also find similar
problems in the application of EKR, referred to as “knowledge sharing dilemmas” (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002). We designed
a 2 by 2 matrix, where the two decisions are the axes (Contribute - yes or no and Adopt - yes or no). Quadrant I is the perfect
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situation, where all participants contribute knowledge and use it. The other 3 quadrants can be described as 3 dominant types
of knowledge sharing problems.
Figure 3. Knowledge sharing in EKR
1) Free-riding problem (Quadrant II): Free-riding is one of the most serious problems in knowledge sharing (Kwok and Gao,
2004). Some participants use the knowledge in systems but are reluctant to share new knowledge. These problems even occur
in some famous systems such as Gnutella. Free-riding can make service unattractive and diminish system performance (Adar
and Huberman, 2000). It is not the perfect EKR situation.
2) Dormant situation (Quadrant III):  No visitors contribute their knowledge to EKR and no one will use it. There are some
reasons for dormant situation: a) People cannot see a personal benefit from contribution; b) participants perceive insufficient
support from top management of organizations; c) KMS requires too much time and effort to contribute knowledge (Cabrera
and Cabrera, 2002). In this situation, people are reluctant to contribute and use knowledge, and thus systems are not being
used.
3) Non-use problem (Quadrant IV): Although knowledge is contributed into the EKR, most participants will “reinvent the
wheel” rather than reuse organizational knowledge. In this way, participants do not improve their performance by benefiting
from the knowledge of others, while contributors have no motivation to upload their knowledge in the future (Garud and
Kumaraswamy, 2005). Non-use problems may not stay in EKR for a long time. In our paper, however, these problems will
be misleading reward Nash-equilibriums.
REWARD AS INCENTIVE
Many researchers have explored economic and social incentives to motivate participants to share knowledge in the context of
KMS (Ba, et al., 2001). Reward is a direct incentive strategy.
Reward systems can be divided into: 1) monetary rewards, such as a bonus, and 2) non-monetary rewards, such as public
recognition (Ba, et al., 2001). Many studies focus on the role of systems for motivating knowledge sharing behavior.
However, there has been little evidence of rewards being effective.
Some studies claim that reward systems are useful and important for most mechanisms of knowledge sharing (Bartol and
Srivastava, 2002; Orlikowski, 1993)and that it is a good investment for organizations (Bartol and Srivastava, 2002).
Kankanhalli and Tan (2005) found that rewards can motivate individuals to seek knowledge from EKR, especially in low
tacit knowledge tasks.
Other studies, however, have found that using rewards is not as universally effective as expected. Moon and Park (2002)
investigated the reward systems at Samsung. They found that reward systems could indeed motivate people to contribute
knowledge, but there were also many problems such as the lack of quality assurance of knowledge.
There are even studies that claim that reward systems have a negative effect. Bock and Kim (2002) found the expected
rewards discouraged the positive attitude toward knowledge sharing. Bock et al. (2005) also found that extrinsic rewards
sometimes negatively influenced attitudes toward knowledge sharing.
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Many studies have focused on the effect of incentives on the single decision-maker’s inter-action with knowledge sharing
systems. There is, however, no discussion about how one user’s behavior impacts on another’s, or how one user can “cheat”
the system with misleading strategies. In the latter section of this paper, we describe our game-theoretical model and
investigate the role of rewards in motivating people to contribute knowledge.
RELEVANT THEORY
Game Theory
Game theory is the study of the interactions among rational players to produce outcomes with respect to the utilities of those
players. None of the plays might have been intended by any of them. Studies of game theory focus on how groups of people
interact (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Some characteristics of knowledge sharing can also be found in the structure of game
theory (Loebecke, Fenema and Powell, 1999). There are some potential opportunities in applying game theory in order to
analyze behaviors of participants in knowledge sharing: 1) Knowledge sharing payoff of an individual in a group is
contingent on others’ knowledgde sharing behavior (Chua, 2003; Muller, Spiliopoulou and Lenz, 2005); and 2) The
phenomenon of “public goods dilemma”, whereby private-rationality leads to organization-irrationality, can also be found in
knowledge sharing (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002; Kalman, Monge, Fulk and Heino, 2002).
Social Exchange Theory
Social exchange theory (SET) posits that individuals engage in social interaction for expected social rewards, such as
approval and respect. People will maximize their benefits and minimize their costs (Blau, 1964; Molm, 1997). Knowledge
sharing in the context of EKR can be seen as the process of social exchange (Kankanhalli, et al., 2005). There are also some
motivators (reciprocity, etc.) and inhibitors (waste of time, etc.) of knowledge sharing activities of  single decision makers in
the EKR.  When participants make decisions to contribute or use knowledge, they will balance the benefits and costs.
Cost and benefit factors in contributing and using knowledge
Some studies have explored the costs and benefits of single decision maker in contributing knowledge and using knowledge
from EKR (Ba, et al., 2001; Goodman and Darr, 1998; Kankanhalli, et al., 2005). Based on SET, the costs of contributing
knowledge include: 1) time and effort cost of codifying knowledge (Ba, et al., 2001), and 2) loss of power (Goodman and
Darr, 1998). The benefits include: 1) Reciprocal benefits, i.e., participants gaining knowledge from others (Wasko and Faraj,
2000), and 2) enjoyment in helping others (Kankanhalli et al., 2005). Self-efficacy is another very important factor (Cabrera
and Cabrera, 2002). Some participants will contribute knowledge in order to enhance their sense of self-efficacy. Thus, the
cost of using knowledge from EKR involves the time and effort wasted on seeking and matching knowledge (Goodman and
Darr, 1998); the benefits relate to users gaining new knowledge from it.
RESEARCH MODEL
In this section, we introduce two game theoretic models with corresponding assumptions and payoff functions. We assume
that other’s contribution is k value to each one.
Simple model: Contribution or no contribution
We first consider a situation in which the quality of knowledge can be easily identified. Participants can only make the choice
of contribution or no contribution.
Assumption 1 (Participants): We consider a simple situation where there are two participants in the game, P1 as active
contributor, P2 as potential contributor.
Assumption 2 (Information structure): Each participant has complete information about the payoff functions and decisions of
others.
Assumption 3 (Process): There are 4 phases in this game. P1 will contribute knowledge first and P2 may use the knowledge
in the second phase. New knowledge can then be contributed in the third phase. In the final phase P1 can choose to use or not
use this new knowledge.
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Payoff function
1) Benefit of contributing knowledge: a) k?Reciprocal benefit; b) s?Knowledge self-efficacy; Active contributors will
gain utility of s from contributing; c) e?Enjoying helping others; Participants will gain utility when others use their
knowledge. If others do not use their knowledge, they will not gain utility. 2) Cost of contributing knowledge: a) tc ?Time
and effort cost of codification; b) Lc ?Fear of losing power. 3) Benefit of using knowledge: k?knowledge can be used for
improving performance. 4) Cost of using knowledge: uc ?Time and effort of seeking and matching knowledge. We assume
the payoff is linear function with these factors and has the payoff function of contributing knowledge: t Le s c c+ - -  ( P1),
t Le c c- -  (P2); payoff function of using knowledge: uk c-  (P1), uk c-  (P2).
Interaction of payoff function
Payoff function of each participant is determined by others’ behavior. For example, P1 contribute knowledge at the beginning;
if P2 use it, P1 will enjoy helping other and gain the utility of e , P2 will gain the knowledge; if  P2 do not use the knowledge,
P2  will  save  the  using  cost,  P1  will  not  gain  the  utility  of e . Participants will choose the behavior by which they can
maximize their utility. We can use the backward induction to analyze these complex balancing processes, and then have the
condition of possible Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
Extensive form
This is a 4 phase game-theoretical framework. The extensive-form is:
Figure 4. The extensive-form of simple model
Proposition 1: (Possible Nash-equilibriums)
There are 4 possible Nash-equilibriums at the end of the game: Perfect situation (S1), Free-riding problem (S3), Non-use
problem (S6) and Dormant situation (S9).
(This proposition is proved in Appendix 1.)
We use reward as the motivator of people’s contribution in the EKR. We assume that reward is associated with one’s added
knowledge contribution, and ( ) 0r r k= ³ .
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Proposition 2: (Adding Reward)
If the reward is sufficiently high, it can effectively motivate people to share knowledge in the EKR. There are 2 possible
equilibriums, S1 and S5.
(This proposition is proved in Appendix 2.)
Corollary 2.1:  If the timing cost of using knowledge from EKR is low enough, the Perfect situation (S1) is the unique Nash
equilibrium.
(This corollary is proved in Appendix 2.)
Complex model: Contribution of high or low quality knowledge
Let us consider the more complex and “real” situation where the quality of knowledge cannot be easily identified.
Participants can choose to contribute high or low quality knowledge. They can also choose not to contribute knowledge.
Assumption 1: Participants can choose the quality of knowledge contributed; they can choose high quality knowledge (CH)
or low quality knowledge (CL) or no contribution. We use hk and lk as the value of high (low) quality knowledge assigned to
the participant.
Assumption 2: Participants can choose the quantity of knowledge contributed.
Assumption 3: The total resource (e.g. energy and knowledge) of each participant is a constant. We use T as the total
resources of participants, c uT nc c= + . cc is the cost of contribution, uc is the cost of searching knowledge, n is the number
of contribution.
Payoff function
We can find that the cost of contributing knowledge is higher when people contribute high quality knowledge,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t h L h c h c lc k c k c k c k+ = > : 1) If people provide high quality knowledge, they will waste more time and effort than
by providing low quality knowledge, ( ) ( )t h t lc k c k> .  2) If they provide their core knowledge, they will lose more power,
( ) ( )L h L lc k c k> . Cost of using knowledge is ( )uc k . If knowledge is codified clearly, others can use the knowledge more
easily, and the cost of using knowledge is lower: ( ) ( )u h u lc k c k< .Total resource of participant a : ( , )a a c uT n c u c c= + .We
use ( , )an c u  as the quantity of knowledge that participant a  contributes. c stands for the type of knowledge quality which
participant a  contributes, { , ,0}c h l= . 0 represents no contribution. u stands for the type of knowledge quality which
participant a uses, { , ,0}u h l= . In limited energy, other’s activities will affect each participant’s quantity of contribution.
For example, if participant b contributes high quality knowledge, participant a  will have more time to use it,
( , ) ( , ) ( , )a a an l l n l h n h h> > .
The extensive form
We now extend the previous game model to include a 4-phase game. P1 can make one choice from “CH, CL or N (No
contribution)” and choose the quantity of contribution. In the second phase, P2 chooses whether to use or not to use
knowledge from the system. In the third phase, he chooses the strategy from “CH, CL or N” and the quantity of contribution.
P1 ends the game with choosing whether to use or not to use this new knowledge. The extensive form of the game model is:
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Figure 5. The extensive-form game in complex model
Proposition 3: (Possible Nash-equilibriums)
There are more complex situations and more possible Nash-equilibriums than the simple model. They involve the Perfect
situation (S1), the Free-riding problem (S5, S15, S21, S23), the Non-use problem (S10, S20), and the Dormant situation
(S25).
(This proposition is proved in Appendix 3.)
Given that a reward is used to motivate the contribution, an organization cannot distinguish between different qualities of
knowledge contributions. It can only give reward assuming that high quality knowledge has been contributed. When the
participants contribute one report of their knowledge, the reward is ( )hr r k= , the total reward of participant a
is ( , ) ( )a a hR n c u r k= .
Proposition 4: (Add Reward)
When the reward is sufficiently high, it misleads participants to an ineffective situation-S19, which is unique Nash-
equilibrium and the participants contribute a considerable quantity of low quality knowledge but do not use knowledge from
EKR.
(This proposition is proved in Appendix 4.)
This situation can be explained as the reward being so attractive that participants find they can gain more without needing to
work hard. Thus, they will “reinvent low quality wheels.” This is an interesting result where active contributors may cheat the
system with low quality knowledge. If there had been no misleading reward, they might have contributed their new idea. In
this situation, the reward will motivate people to maximize their private utility, but the outcome is ineffective. Reward is a
dangerous strategy in this situation since knowledge quality cannot be easily identified.
DISCUSSION
Goodman and Darr (1998) have claimed that reward systems which only focus on local units versus organizational interests
should reduce the propensity to exchange knowledge. Let us consider adding a review process to reward systems. There are
many knowledge review strategies.
The first strategy is employing a “knowledge steward”:  We can employ some knowledge experts, who will judge the quality
of knowledge. They do not only index and package knowledge, but reward contributions based on the knowledge quality: 1)
Giving reward to the knowledge contributor, ( )h hr r k= , ( )l lr r k= and 2) deciding which knowledge is to be saved by the
organization. The “knowledge steward” strategy has been used in many electronic knowledge sharing systems and
communities. For example, Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) of universities employ some experienced students to manage the
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system. The tasks of these students include deleting some useless messages and rewarding with points the knowledge
contributor who provide interesting knowledge. If the contributors gain more points, they rise to the higher rank of “directory
of contributors”. Some companies such as Samsung (Moon and Park, 2002), have designed expert review systems to judge
knowledge quality.
The second strategy is “voting” where the knowledge users can vote on the knowledge which is useful to them. The system
gives points to knowledge contributors for making positive comments. This strategy gives explicit benefit to contributors for
gaining a high number of points. For example, “Baidu” (a network company in China) has developed a new knowledge
sharing system?“I Know” (zhidao.baidu.com). “I know” is an electronic platform for solving problems in practice.
Participants can contribute their ideas and have users vote to judge the knowledge quality. Of course, the contributors who
provide high quality knowledge will gain more points. However, there are some potential problems in applying this strategy:
1) Knowledge users may not be motivated to vote, and 2) if contributors think they are not experts of these problems, they
will choose not to contribute their ideas. As mentioned, some studies claim that using rewards for motivation is not a unique
strategy as many organizations have created a culture of collaboration within their organization which could also facilitate
knowledge sharing (Goodman and Darr, 1998; Muller, et al., 2005).
CONCLUSION
The propositions presented in this paper rely on two basic game models. First, with the simple model, we can explain many
knowledge sharing dilemmas where using rewards is effective. In the complex model, we have highlighted the possible
knowledge sharing problems, concluding that an unqualified reward strategy can potentially be dangerous. It can mislead
participants to contribute low quality knowledge. The complex model may be more useful in realistic situations, as
knowledge is almost always complex in the EKR. Some review strategies can help solve this misleading problem. The
strategy of employing a “knowledge steward” can provide knowledge quality screening to an acceptable level, but the salary
of experts is an added cost to the organization. “Voting” can encourage a positive attitude towards knowledge contributions.
This strategy allows participants to manage knowledge repositories by themselves. However, there are some potential threats
such as lower motivation for contributing knowledge for fear of negative comments.
Future research could include:
1) Interviewing real organizations and analyzing their real knowledge sharing problems and the role of rewards in different
situations;
2) Empirical research to find whether the review process can enhance the effectiveness of rewards;
3) A comparison of different review strategies to find the relationship between different environments and different strategies;
4) Introduction of other factors into the game model, such as sharing norms and trust. This effort may enable the model to
explain more “real” phenomenon and predict more useful results.
The mix of game theoretic approaches coupled with empirical studies promise a higher level of understanding of EKR issues
with implications for both research and practice.
REFERENCES
1. Adar, E. and Huberman, B. A. (2000) Free riding on Gnutella, First Monday, 10, 2.
2. Alavi, M. and Leidner, D. E. (1999) Knowledge management systems: Issues, challenges and benefits, Communications
of AIS, 1, 1-37.
3. Ba, S., Stallaert, J. and Whinston, A. B. (2001) Research commentary: Introducing a third dimension in information
systems design- The cased for incentive alignment, Information Systems Research, 12, 3, 225-239.
4. Bartol, K. M. and Srivastava, A. (2002) Encouraging knowledge sharing: The role of organizational reward systems,
Journal of Leadership and Organization Studies, 9, 1, 64-76.
5. Blau, P. M. (1964) Exchange and power in social life, Wiley, New York
6. Bock, G. W. and Kim, Y. G. (2002) Breaking the myths of rewards: An exploratory study of attitudes about knowledge
sharing, Information Resources Management Journal, 15, 2, 14-21.
7. Bock, G. W., Zmud, R. W., Kim, Y. G. and Lee, J. N. (2005) Behavioral intention formation in knowledge sharing:
Examining the roles of extrinsic motivators, social-psychological forces, and organizational climate, MIS Quarterly, 29,
1, 87-111.
 1688
Zhang et al.                                                                                                                           Is Reward always effective as Incentive in EKR?
Proceedings of the Twelfth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Acapulco, Mexico August 04th-06th 2006
8. Brazelton, J. and Gorry, G. A. (2003) Creating a knowledge-sharing community: If you built it, will they come?,
Communications of the ACM, 46, 2, 23-25.
9. Cabrera, A. and Cabrera, E. F. (2002) Knowledge sharing dilemmas, Organization Studies, 23, 5, 687-710.
10. Chua, A. (2003) Knowledge sharing: A game people play, Aslib Proceedings, 2003, 117-129.
11. Davenport, T. H. and Prusak, L. (1998) Working knowledge: How organizations manage what they know, Harvard
Business School Press, Boston
12. Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1991) Game theory, MIT Press, Cambridge
13. Garud, R. and Kumaraswamy, A. (2005) Vicious and virtuous circles in the management of knowledge: The case of
infosys technologies, MIS Quarterly, 29, 1, 9-33.
14. Goodman, P. S. and Darr, E. D. (1998) Computer-aided systems and communities: Mechanisms for organizational
learning in distributed environments, MIS Quarterly, 22, 4, 417-440.
15. Kalman, M. E., Monge, P., Fulk, J. and Heino, R. (2002) Motivations to resolve communication dilemmas in database-
mediated collaboration, COMMUNICATION RESEARCH, 29, 2, 125-154.
16. Kankanhalli, A., Tan, B. C. Y. and Wei, K. K. (2005) Contributing knowledge to electronic knowledge repositories: An
emprical investigation, MIS Quarterly, 29, 1, 113-143.
17. Knakanhalli, A., Tan, B. C. Y. and Wei, K.-K. (2005) Understanding seeking from electronic knowledge repositories:
An empirical study, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 56, 11, 1156-1166.
18. Kwok, J. S. H. and Gao, S. (2004) Knowledge sharing community in P2P network: A study of motivational perspective,
Journal of Knowledge Management, 8, 1, 94-102.
19. Loebecke, C., Fenema, P. C. V. and Powell, P. (1999) Co-operation and knowledge transfer, The DATA BASE for
Advances in Information Systems, 30, 2, 14-25.
20. Markus, L. (2001) Toward a theory of knowledge reuse: Types of knowledge reuse situations and factors in reuse
success, Journal of Management Information Systems, 18, 1, 57-94.
21. Molm, L. D. (1997) Coercive power in social exchange, Cambridge University Press, New York
22. Moon, H. K. and Park, M. S. (2002) Effective reward systems for knowledge sharing: Facilitating knowledge flow at
Samsung life insurance, Knowledge Management Review, 4, 6, 22-25.
23. Muller, R. M., Spiliopoulou, M. and Lenz, H.-J. (2005) The influence of incentives and culture on knowledge sharing,
Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2005, 1-10.
24. Orlikowski, W. J. (1993) Learning from notes: Organizational issues in groupware implementation, Information Society,
9, 3, 237-251.
25. Wasko,  M.  M.  and  Faraj,  S.  (2000)  It  is  what  one  does':  Why  people  participate  and  help  others  in  electronic
communities of practice, Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 9, 2, 155-173.
 1689
Zhang et al.                                                                                                                           Is Reward always effective as Incentive in EKR?
Proceedings of the Twelfth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Acapulco, Mexico August 04th-06th 2006
APPENDIX 1
In each situation of simple model, the payoffs of participant 1 (P1) and participant 2 (P2) are:
Situation 1: {C, U, C, U}. 1 t L uP k e s c c c= + + - - - , 2 t L uP k e c c c= + - - -
Situation 2: {C, U, C, N}. 1 t LP e s c c= + - - , 2 t L uP k c c c= - - -
Situation 3: {C, U, N, N}. 1 t LP e s c c= + - - , 2 uP k c= -
Situation 4: {C, N, C, U}. 1 t L uP k s c c c= + - - - , 2 t LP e c c= - -
Situation 5: {C, N, C, N}. 1 t LP s c c= - - , 2 t LP c c= - -
Situation 6: {C, N, N, N}. 1 t LP s c c= - - , 2 0P =
Situation 7: {N, N, C, U}. 1 uP k c= - , 2 t LP e c c= - -
Situation 8: {N, N, C, N}. 1 0P = , 2 t LP c c= - -
Situation 9: {N, N, N, N}. 1 0P = , 2 0P =
Proof of Proposition 1: We use a as a threshold that each participant will choose whether use knowledge or
not, ua k c= - .We useb as a threshold that P2 will choose whether contribute knowledge or not, t Lb e c c= - - .
Using Backward Induction Analysis?we can find there are 4 possible pure-strategy Nash-equilibriums.
1)  Situation  1:  {C,  U,  C,  U}?Perfect Situation: If 0a > , 0b > . The Situation 1 is the Nash-equilibrium. Each one will
contribute his knowledge and they all use others knowledge from systems.
2)  Situation  3:  {C,  U,  N,  N}?Free-riding: If 0a > , 0b < , 0b s+ > . The situation 3 is the Nash-equilibrium. P1 will
contribute and P2 will use the knowledge but withhold his own knowledge. This can be explained as the Free-riding
phenomenon spread in the real environment.
3)  Situation  6:  {C,  N,  N,  N}?Non-use problem: If 0a < , 0b s+ > . The situation 6 is the Nash-equilibrium. P1 will
contribute his knowledge and no one will use them. This can be explained as the phenomenon of Non-use problem.
4) Situation 9: {N, N, N, N}?Dormant situation: If 0b s+ < . There is the Dormant situation that no one will contribute and
no one will use the knowledge. They will not share knowledge in knowledge sharing system.
APPENDIX 2
Proof of Proposition 2: If organization adds reward to motivate contributing, there are 5 possible pure-strategy Nash
equilibriums in simple model.
1)  Situation  1:  {C,  U,  C,  U}?higher possibility of Perfect Situation: If 0a > , 0b r+ > . We can find the possibility of
equilibrium in Situation 1 is higher in adding reward.
2)  Situation  3:  {C,  U,  N,  N}?lower possibility of Free-riding: If 0a > , 0b r+ < , 0b s r+ + > . If r is sufficiently high
that r e> , we can find the possibility of equilibrium in Situation 3 is lower. Reward can effectively solve the Free-riding
problem.
3)  Situation  6:  {C,  N,  N,  N}?lower possibility of Non-use problem: If 0a < , 0b r e+ - < , 0b s r+ + > . If r e> , we
can easily find that the possibility of equilibrium in Situation 6 is lower. Reward can effectively solve the use-problem.
4)  Situation  9:  {N,  N,  N,  N}?lower possibility of Dormant situation: If 0b s r+ + < . The possibility of equilibrium in
Situation 9 is lower. Reward can effectively solve the Dormant problem.
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5) Situation 5: {C, N, C, N}?If 0a < , 0b r e+ - > , 0b s r+ + > . We also find situation 5 is possible Nash equilibriums,
which is not possible in non-reward environment. This situation can be explained as knowledge Non-use problem in real
organization.
If reward is sufficiently high, there are 2 possible Nash equilibriums. 1) If 0a >  (all participants will use knowledge), and
r b> - (reward is high enough), the Nash-equilibrium is S1. 2) If 0a < (all participants will not use knowledge), and
r e b> - (reward is high enough), the Nash-equilibrium is S5.
Proof  of  Corollary  2.1: If reward is sufficiently high and 0ua k c= - > , the Nash equilibrium is Perfect situation (S1). If
time cost of using knowledge from EKR is low enough ( uc k< ), S1 is the unique Nash equilibrium. We can use technology
strategies (e.g. classification of knowledge) to reduce time cost of usage.
APPENDIX 3
In complex model, total energy of each participant is a constant, 1 1( , ) c uT n c u c c= + , 2 2 ( , ) c uT n c u c c= + . Payoffs of P1
and P2 are:
Situation 1: {CH, U, CH, U} 1 2 1 1( , ) ( , )( )hP n h h k n h h e s T= + + - , 2 1 2 2( , ) ( , )hP n h h k n h h e T= + -
Situation 2: {CH, U, CH, N} 1 1 1( ,0)( )P n h e s T= + - , 2 1 2( ,0) hP n h k T= -
Situation 3: {CH, U, CL, U} 1 2 1 1( , ) ( , )( )lP n l h k n h l e s T= + + - , 2 1 2 2( , ) ( , )hP n h l k n l h e T= + -
Situation 4: {CH, U, CL, N} 1 1 1( ,0)( )P n h e s T= + - , 2 1 2( ,0) hP n h k T= -
Situation 5: {CH, U, N, N} 1 1 1( ,0)( )P n h e s T= + - , 2 1( ,0) ( )h u hP n h k c k= -
Situation 6: {CH, N, CH, U} 1 2 1 1( ,0) ( , )hP n h k n h l s T= + - , 2 2 2( ,0)P n h e T= -
Situation 7: {CH, N, CH, N} 1 1 1( ,0)P n h s T= - , 2 2 2 ( ,0) ( )c hP T n h c k= - = -
Situation 8: {CH, N, CL, U} 1 2 1 1( ,0) ( , )lP n l k n h l s T= + - , 2 2 2( ,0)P n l e T= -
Situation 9: {CH, N, CL, N} 1 1 1( ,0)P n h s T= - , 2 2 2 ( ,0) ( )c lP T n l c k= - = -
Situation 10: {CH, N, N, N} 1 1 1( ,0)P n h s T= - , 2 0P =
Situation 11: {CL, U, CH, U} 1 2 1 1( , ) ( , )( )hP n h l k n l h e s T= + + - , 2 1 2 2( , ) ( , )hP n l h k n h l e T= + -
Situation 12: {CL, U, CH, N} 1 1 1( ,0)( )P n l e s T= + -  , 2 1 2( ,0) lP n l k T= -
Situation 13: {CL, U, CL, U} 1 2 1 1( , ) ( , )( )lP n l l k n l l e s T= + + - , 2 1 2( , ) lP n l l k T= -
Situation 14: {CL, U, CL, N} 1 1 1( ,0)( )P n l e s T= + - , 2 1 2( ,0) lP n l k T= -
Situation 15: {CL, U, N, N} 1 1 1( ,0)( )P n l e s T= + - , 2 1( ,0) ( )l u lP n l k c k= -
Situation 16: {CL, N, CH, U} 1 2 1 1( ,0) ( , )hP n h k n l h s T= + - , 2 2 2( ,0)P n h e T= -
Situation 17: {CL, N, CH, N} 1 1 1( ,0)P n l s T= - , 2 2 2 ( ,0) ( )c hP T n h c k= - = -
Situation 18: {CL, N, CL, U} 1 2 1 1( ,0) ( , )lP n l k n l l s T= + - , 2 2 2( ,0)P n l e T= -
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Situation 19: {CL, N, CL, N} 1 1 1( ,0)P n l s T= - , 2 2 2 ( ,0) ( )c lP T n l c k= - = -
Situation 20: {CL, N, N, N} 1 1 1( ,0)P n l s T= - , 2 0P =
Situation 21: {N, N, CH, U} 1 2 ( ,0) ( )h u hP n h k c k= - , 2 2 2( ,0)P n h e T= -
Situation 22: {N, N, CH, N} 1 0P = , 2 2 2 ( ,0) ( )c hP T n h c k= - = -
Situation 23: {N, N, CL, U} 1 2 ( ,0) ( )l u lP n l k c k= - , 2 2 2( ,0)P n l e T= -
Situation 24: {N, N, CL, N} 1 0P = , 2 ( )c lP c k= -
Situation 25: {N, N, N, N} 1 0P = , 2 0P =
Proof of Proposition 3: There are more possible Nash-equilibriums than first model, and they can be classified as Perfect
situation (S1), Free-riding problem (S5, S15, S21, S23), Non-use problem (S10, S20), and Dormant situation (S25). S7, S9,
S17, S19 do not exist in complex model. For example, we consider the Perfect situation-S1, which is possible equilibrium:










b) In phase 3, the payoff of P2 in S1 must be higher than S3 and S5,
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Proof of Proposition 4: If reward is sufficiently high, S19-{CL, N, CL, N} is the unique Nash-equilibrium. We consider the
new condition of S19:
a) In phase 4, the payoff of P1 in S19 must be higher than S18, so 2( )
( )h lu l
Ts r k k
c k
+ >
b) In phase 3, the payoff of P2 in S1 must be higher than S17 and S20, ( ) ( )h c lr k c k>






c kr k e
c k
>
d) In phase 1,the payoff of P1 in S1 must be higher than S9 and S25, ( ) ( )h c lr k s c k+ >
If reward is sufficiently high, all participants will choose to contribute much low quality knowledge but not use knowledge
from EKR.
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